Do We Have Reason To Trust Our Moral Intuitions?
We know murdering civilians is wrong. Beyond violating international law, our moral intuition convicts us of this. Why, then, did the 9/11 hijackers think they were justified in a terrorist attack resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths? Unlike psychopathic killers, whom we may claim are desensitized to moral proddings, the hijackers believed their objective was morally right. Their moral intuition did not flag their actions as wrong but seemingly reinforced the opposite. Why do our moral intuitions seem sound, but theirs skewed? If the hijackers' moral intuitions permitted such a tragically wrong act, how can we be certain ours do not lead us down disastrous paths we blindly believe are right?
One reason this quandary is not a pressing reality in our lives is that we have evaluated the 9/11 hijackers using our own moral intuitions. This may seem obvious, but it means we are not likely to unwittingly commit such acts since they are grievous by our moral standards. However, this does not guarantee our standards are the objectively correct moral code by which right and wrong should be judged. Among the majority who agree terrorism is wrong, there are sizable discrepancies in moral beliefs, and consequently our moral intuitions. So, concerns that our moral intuitions are misleading — despite how right they feel — are still valid.
How can we assess our moral intuitions' trustworthiness? What can we use as an absolute measure of right, to measure our convictions against? While no absolute, accessible moral code exists, we need not be entirely blind in evaluating our moral intuitions.
It is common for group members (cultural, religious, political, etc,) to have relatively highly aligned moral intuitions. However, even if one group's members agreed on morals exactly, different groups would still disagree. Furthermore, even within closely aligned groups, there are bound to be differences in moral beliefs; these differences become more frequent and pronounced as actions become more specific. For example, Robin and his friend agree stealing is generally wrong. However, Robin makes an exception if one specifically steals from corrupted wealthy elites to fund a noble cause, while his friend remains steadfast, asserting stealing is always immoral. Such inconsistencies signify a credibility gap in our moral intuitions.
Despite discrepancies, there are comprehensive moral statements nearly everyone agrees on — notably murder being wrong. This wide-scale agreement leads to near-unanimous consternation towards disasters like 9/11, explaining such instances' rarity. These across-the-board moral agreements strongly indicate they possess some veracity. While a majority may mistake falsehoods for truth for a spell (such as the sun orbiting Earth), typically, when a belief is held by more people for a longer time, it is more likely true. International humane laws and similar laws aligning with a significant portion of humanity's moral intuitions are compelling evidence our moral intuitions have some basis for credibility.
Our moral intuitions apparently have a reliable underpinning but are influenced — sometimes enhanced or polluted — by external factors. This underpinning, I term our ‘innate conscience’. Momentarily, our innate conscience comprises our moral intuition entirely. However, the moment we encounter the world, it impresses upon our moral intuition, preventing anyone from retaining untainted moral instinct. Moral intuition is the sum of innate conscience and influential external factors. These influences determine the contents of our moral intuition and the extent to which we value and rely on it. This model enables us to explain important phenomena, including moral intuition catastrophes like 9/11, and why some seemingly lead more moral lives than others. Firstly, let us establish grounds for believing we possess a trustworthy, universally shared innate conscience.
For an innate conscience to exist, it must follow that humans would still display certain humane characteristics, even without a moral upbringing; nature would morally guide us, to a degree, irrespective of nurture. These humane characteristics are really human since morality and conscience are perhaps the most significant factors separating us from other animals.
Investigations of infants suggest that even when life has just begun, signs of moral sensibilities are apparent. According to Yale psychologist Paul Bloom, sufficiently developed infants can detect others' distress and respond with stroking, attempting to soothe, which indicates empathy and compassion. Additionally, infants possess an early understanding of fairness (equally distributing elements) and justice (recognizing helpfulness should be rewarded and belligerency punished) (1). A study at Osaka University was conducted to discover more about morality's presence in infants by analyzing third-party punishment. Infants controlled a computer simulation of interacting shapes, where they could destroy a shape by directing their gaze on it for a sufficient time. The researchers found infants prolonged their gaze at shapes displaying aggressive behavior, "punishing them". These infants were non-verbal and therefore too young to have been taught concrete ideas of right and wrong (2).
While empathy and favoring helpfulness and fairness do not directly demonstrate moral instinct or a trustworthy innate conscience, these findings suggest a shared predisposition to display what can only be described as human characteristics; as described above, these human characteristics bespeak humaneness, which stems from moral awareness. In other words, these shared infant behaviors indicate a moral awareness “programmed” in us — an innate conscience. This fact gives us reason to believe they are trustworthy; why would we possess instincts detrimental to our survival?
Psychologists have identified four “moral emotions” (guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride) that humans uniquely experience, more basic emotions being identifiable in other animals. Moral emotions originate from self-awareness, which conscience also relies on. They influence us to act in ways more likely to safeguard the well-being of our larger societal sphere. While basic emotions compel us to act in self-beneficial ways, moral emotions have humanity's interest at heart (3). Moral emotions instill within us a shared ethical code, guiding us to behave in ways protective of our kind; they are present in us all, seemingly working to humanity's advantage. Thus, we can reasonably consider them when making decisions.
Both moral emotions and an innate conscience, if real, help us make upright, effectively selfless decisions. It should be noted, though, that only an innate conscience would be selfless and objective — moral emotions depend on self-awareness and preserving self-image. However, since both are shared universally among humanity and lead us to make generally considered ethical decisions, moral emotions can be viewed as strong evidence for, and manifestations of, our innate conscience. Arguments for a trustworthy innate conscience are bolstered by the trustworthiness of our moral emotions.
Thus fortified with indications of an innate conscience, we can analyze our environment's effects on these momentarily untouched moral compasses. As mentioned, our moral intuitions are heavily influenced by our environments. Nearly anything impresses upon them: family, peers, religion, media, authority, politics, etc. As others mold our moral intuitions, as we mold others’, and as each is influenced by shared external factors, we find ourselves in groups with varying degrees of moral alignment. Perhaps members of the same religious congregation experience considerable alignment in their moral beliefs. However, more broadly, even people from one nation may have overlapping ideas of right and wrong in variance with another nation's. While humanity agrees on certain moral pronouncements nearly across the board, the extent of our widespread agreement on moral matters — tied together by threads of lingering innate conscience — is worn thin by external influences, leading us to experience vastly different moral intuitions.
Beyond determining the content of our moral intuitions, external influences also affect the extent to which morals play a determining factor in our lives. Some simply seem to care more about living morally than others. This does not mean some are born with more fully developed innate consciences than others — only some have had theirs encouraged to grow to greater dimensions. While we each begin with the same dose of innate conscience, for some, their environment has not taught them to prioritize or value this aspect of their lives as much as others. Accordingly, moral intuitions are not equally prominent in people's lives. Similarly, people experience moral emotions to different extents — one may feel incredibly remorseful and another guiltless after the same action. This reflects how deeply external factors have encouraged us to attune to and heed our moral intuitions.
We can now attempt to understand disastrous moral intuition failings, like 9/11. The hijackers seemingly had morality stressed considerably in their lives — perhaps more than most. The issue was not their moral intuitions being watered down. Instead, the contents of their moral intuitions were negatively shaped by their leader and social group — Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. This influence was powerful enough to twist their innate conscience, producing moral intuitions that reinforced their actions as morally justified, instead of suggesting murdering citizens was wrong.
All our innate consciences have been “tampered with”, though not always negatively, and not typically so extremely as to condone terrorism. But how can we discern when our moral intuition suggests the right actions, or when it has strayed dangerously far from our innate conscience? Unfortunately, certainty is impossible, since the precise laws of our innate conscience are a mystery. However, the concept of moral courage can provide some guidance when endeavoring to assess our moral intuitions objectively.
Moral courage is defined by William Miller as “the capacity to overcome the fear of shame and humiliation in order to admit one’s mistakes, to confess a wrong, to reject evil conformity, to denounce injustice, and to defy immoral or imprudent orders” (4). At first, this definition seemingly contradicts the idea of moral emotions being reliable since it involves us rising above shame, embarrassment, and pride. However, it refers to overcoming surface-level versions of these emotions: experiencing them because we view ourselves in the eyes of others. On a deeper level, one would only remain ashamed of oneself when not acting with moral courage. When referring to moral emotions, how we feel about ourselves is what matters.
Requiring moral courage may reveal our actions are right, meaning our moral intuition aligns with our innate conscience. The weakness of our moral intuition is its indiscriminate impressionability from external influence; therein lies its potential danger. However, moral courage involves rejecting what our immediate social culture would have us do. It "risks being isolated and singled out for painful personal consequences such as ridicule, rejection, and loss of job and social standing. . . when it is displayed it is of real value in preventing and righting wrongs” (4). When acting with moral courage, one’s moral intuition stirs one to take actions potentially harmful to oneself.
9/11 may seem to undermine the reliability of moral courage since the hijackers put themselves at risk, making the ultimate sacrifice. However, they did not undergo isolation or rejection — they were praised and supported by their social group. Thus, they did not exhibit moral courage, which involves rejecting the standards or beliefs of one’s society (4). Conversely, stories of Nazi resistors, like Sophie Scholl, are examples of moral courage. While they too risked their lives, in many cases losing them, they drastically opposed the societal demands of the day and were extremely isolated.
Moral courage is limited, though, in helping us assess our moral intuition. Many times our moral intuition may lead us rightly without moral courage being necessary, as our peers are often in agreement with us when making morally sound decisions. Nevertheless, moral courage is a helpful tool, as its presence indicates we are likely on the right path.
But, even if moral courage is not applicable in such situations, the fact we often agree with our peers about what is right is perhaps the strongest, most obvious indicator that we have reason to trust our moral intuition, at least to a degree. Ultimately, society functions because we observe our moral intuitions. No matter how logical and objective we make them seem, at their core, laws are codifications of significant overlaps in our moral intuitions. These overlaps occur because we each have begun life with one, true, innate conscience.
Endnotes
1. Bloom, Paul. "The Moral Life of Babies." Interview by Gareth Cook. Scientific American, 12 Nov. 2013, www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-moral-life-of-babies/.
2. Osaka University. "Are We Born with a Moral Compass?" Science Daily, 9 June 2022, www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2022/06/220609131930.htm.
3. Simons, Ilana. "The Four Moral Emotions." Psychology Today, 15 Nov. 2009, www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/the-literary-mind/200911/the-four-moral-emotions.
4. Thomas, Ted, and Ira Chaleff. "Moral Courage and Intelligent Disobedience." Simons Center, thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IAJ-8-1-Winter2017-pg58-66.pdf.